changed to transform welfare into a work-based system." 12 In addition, Wisconsin's welfare bureaucracy has been reinvented through wide use of private contractors to deliver services, including the total privatization of welfare administration in Milwaukee, site of most of the state's remaining welfare cases.
Wisconsin's welfare record is unique. Thus, the reasons for the success become interesting and important.
DETERMINING THE REASONS
Why should we trace this success to government at all? In the past, academic observers have attributed Wisconsin's welfare decline, like that of the nation currently, to unusually good economic conditions and reductions in welfare benefit levels, which render fewer families eligible for aid. It is true that Wisconsin has enjoyed below-average unemployment in recent years, and that benefits, after a cut in 1987, were not raised in nominal terms for 10 years, allowing them to fall further with inflation. 13 However, many other states had equally good economies and allowed benefits to fall, without recording the same reductions in dependency. Statistical analysis of the Wisconsin fall suggests that it is due partly to economic conditions but also to the enforcement of work by the state's new welfare policies. 14 Another argument is that it is easy to reform welfare in Wisconsin because it is a small state with few blacks and Hispanics, the groups most seriously dependent on welfare. Actually, Wisconsin's population of 5 million is about average for the states, and in 1993, 31 percent of its welfare recipients were black, not far below the 36 percent figure for the nation in 1994. Although Wisconsin has few Hispanics on welfare, it has more Asians and Native Americans than the norm. The white proportion among recipients was 47 percent, compared to 37 percent for the nation. 15 Since 1994, the continuing fall in the rolls, which is greatest among whites, has made the remaining recipients even more heavily nonwhite. Nor does Wisconsin escape the problems of urban America. Milwaukee, where most of the remaining cases are concentrated, is heavily black and Hispanic. According to a recent study, it is one of the most segregated and depressed cities in America. 16 Yet welfare decline has been dramatic even in
Milwaukee.
In short, favorable social and economic conditions alone cannot explain Wisconsin's welfare success. The state's secret must lie somewhere within politics or government. One might suspect that the Wisconsin public is especially insistent about reforming welfare. It is true that polls in the state reveal a strong fear that high benefits are attracting poor people from other states, and a still more intense desire to change welfare lifestyle. Majorities of 80 percent or more favor tougher child support enforcement and requiring recipients to work and keep their children in school, on pain of reductions in their grants. 17 But in this Wisconsinites are no different from voters in other states, most of whom want the same kind of reforms. 18 What stands out about Wisconsin is not the shape of opinion but the fact that government here, more than anywhere else, has actually changed welfare in the way the public wants.
In explaining that, the performance of government itself is critical. Reforming welfare by changing lifestyle is difficult. It is not enough to give or deny aid as such. Rather, one must combine aid with functioning requirements so that the recipients work and fulfill other social expectations (such as getting through school and obeying the law) in return for support. The system must be both generous and demanding toward the recipients. In this sense, it must become paternalist. 19 To accomplish this, legislators have to enact the required policies, and then administrators have to execute them, a complex undertaking. If most states have not done that, it is chiefly because government has been unequal to these tasks, for two main reasons.
First, politicians are usually more polarized about welfare than is the public. Typically, liberals want to be generous toward the poor, conservatives demanding, but not both at once. One side will not countenance serious work obligations for the dependent; the other will not pay for the bureaucracy and child care needed to enforce work. Until PRWORA, that impasse prevented decisive change at the national level. 20 Traditionally, some important states, notably New York and California, have passed 6 merely cosmetic reforms, or they have delegated the tough decisions about change to their counties, a habit that continues under PRWORA.
The second big problem is administrative. The welfare bureaucracy in many states is simply unequal to grafting a serious work mission onto the aid operation. To do that requires continuing to aid families while at the same time inducting them into job search and other activities meant to promote independence. In most big cities, work activities remain largely peripheral to income maintenance, a fact masked by the current caseload decline.
I hypothesize that Wisconsin has succeeded with reform mainly because government is more capable there than in most states. That is, the politicians could agree on reform and the bureaucracy could execute it. I deal in this paper with the political side of that story. The question is why Wisconsin's parties were able to agree not only on change but on a radical reform that exceeded what either of them had previously contemplated. The reasons, I argue, are partly that the parties are more collaborative than they seem to be in other urban states and partly that they draw upon a special political culture that stresses both social obligations and problem-solving. My sources include other studies of the Wisconsin reform, interviews with legislators and administrators who played a key role in reform, and reviews of news stories about the politics of reform. 21 Is good government also the key to welfare reform in other states? It is difficult to generalize from a single case study. Methodologists advise researchers that they cannot draw much inference about causes unless they examine a wide range of variation in both their dependent and explanatory terms. 22 and Parental and Family Responsibility ("Bridefare"), a set of incentives to deter parental breakup among the poor. Most of these programs required waivers of normal federal rules from Washington. All the while, the state built up welfare work requirements in AFDC. Work programs reached more and more of the caseload, and by the early 1990s they emphasized work in immediate jobs, rather than education and training.
A more radical phase of reform began in 1993, when the state enacted Work Not Welfare (WNW). This was an experiment in which families were limited to 2 years of cash aid, and they had to work for it by discharging specified activities. In 1994 came Work First, an attempt to divert applicants for aid from welfare by arranging some other means of support, often a job or help from families. Other than Learnfare, the experiments were instituted initially only in selected counties, usually outside Milwaukee. But in March 1996, the demands to look for work in advance of aid and to earn one's grant with activities were extended to the entire state through Self-Sufficiency First (SSF) and Pay for Performance (PFP). Finally, in September 1997, the state instituted W-2, in which all adult recipients must work at some level. Spells of aid under W-2 are generally limited to 2 years, and no family can get assistance for a total of more than 5 years.
Except for a brief uptick in 1991, during the national recession, the AFDC caseload fell continuously throughout the reform period. It seems to have been driven down mostly by good economic conditions in the late 1980s, then by toughening welfare work policies in the early 1990s, finally by diversion after 1994. 24 Many expected that the decline would abate after the most employable clients were placed and only the harder-to-serve remained. But SSF and PFP led to wholesale departures from the rolls and a sharp fall in new applications for aid, trends that continued with the implementation of PRWORA was an example of conservative victory, since it was an unabashedly conservative measure that President Clinton signed only reluctantly.
In Wisconsin, welfare in the past had been partisan. When Republicans in the Assembly first forced through cuts in welfare benefits in 1969, they did so to save money, and their rhetoric questioned the very legitimacy of aid. Democrats fought the cuts, and radical priests led welfare recipients from Milwaukee in marches on Madison. The episode galvanized the liberal constituency behind welfare as never before. Churches, advocates, Democratic politicians, even unions united to defend a generous welfare policy against unreasoning reaction. This helps explain why the indulgent, undemanding character of that system went unquestioned for so long. 33 At this point, both parties were entrenched in positions where they favored or opposed big government as such-the very polarization that long prevented fundamental change in Washington.
That sort of estrangement lingered into the Thompson era. There were moments, especially early on in Thompson's quest, when Democratic leaders such as Tom Loftus announced that they had "irreconcilable differences" with him over welfare. 34 Thompson himself averred that his leading opponents were committed liberals who opposed him root and branch. In the early years, they allowed him only "limited experiments." 35 Indeed, they defeated or delayed many of his early proposals, and he was able to force through his benefit cut and Learnfare in 1987 only through aggressive use of his partial veto. He wielded this power, in effect, to rewrite the state budget, which contained many of his programs, by expanding the benefit cut and toughening Learnfare far beyond what the legislature had authorized.
Democrats were outraged. They fought in vain to overturn the vetoes, first in the legislature and then in the courts.
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If we accept a partisan interpretation, the parties do not collaborate, and election outcomes become critical because they determine which party can coerce the other. Thompson's defeat of Earl in 1986 was fundamental to change, because Earl defended entitlement, or aid without work tests, while
Thompson rejected it. Also, it was critical that Republicans regained their legislative majority in 1993-94, after years in the wilderness, because this allowed them to enact the more radical phase of reform. With Democrats in charge, W-2 would certainly have been more moderate, providing more aid to the employable and allowing more education and training in place of work. Indeed, when Democrats recovered control of the Senate in 1996, they tried to liberalize Thompson's system by abolishing
Learnfare and paying wages rather than welfare grants to W-2 clients in community service jobs.
Thompson had to beat back some of these attempts with further vetoes. 36 The trouble with this account, however, is that it cannot explain how much Thompson achieved. Democrats in favor. 39 Even the few Democratic liberals who voted against W-2 admitted that much of
Thompson's support came from their own party. 40 
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Nor did collaboration imply that Democrats were simply intimidated. The outcome was not a messy compromise, nor was it a clear-cut victory for the conservatives. W-2 did end entitlement and impose the most severe work requirements in the nation. But it also promised huge expansions of child care and government jobs for people needing aid, and it extended unprecedented child and health care subsidies to the entire low-wage working population. This was a radical reform that went far beyond what either Republicans or Democrats had previously advocated. The spirit of W-2 is socially conservative in that good behavior is enforced on the dependent, but also liberal in that the enforcing is done by a generous government using new benefits. The outcome was neither conservative nor liberal in the traditional sense, but paternalist.
REPUBLICAN MODERATION
The consensual yet radical nature of the Wisconsin outcome is what requires a deeper exploration. One explanation for it is that the positions conservatives took on welfare in the 1980s were notably more moderate than in the past, making agreement with liberals easier.
The traditional conservative stance toward welfare had been either to oppose aid to the workingaged on principle or to reject the extra spending it took to reform welfare. But in the 1980s, conservatives in both parties tended to attack the abuses in welfare rather than the institution or its cost. Joseph Andrea tore the skin off the issue by protesting migration, but he claimed that his intent was to rebuild, not destroy. He wanted to "provide child care, provide a job, to get these people jump-started"; he never questioned the need for a welfare system. 41 To liberal defenders of aid such as Tony Earl, that sort of concern, despite the passion it aroused, sounded less "ideological" and more "practical" than the attacks on AFDC that they had previously battled. 42 Republicans, for their part, were sobered by their earlier defeats over welfare. In reforming the system, they wanted to appear "less punitive," lest they ignite another advocate/liberal crusade. 43 44 Thompson's most significant initial proposal was his demand to cut AFDC benefits. That sounds like a traditional conservative device to reduce spending and taxes, but Thompson justified it as a way of funding bigger work programs. The point was not to cut back welfare as such but to shift the form of aid from income maintenance toward employment. The byword was "Cut, but invest." Democrats could easily justify that to their consciences and constituents. 45 Thompson also made no further cuts in AFDC benefits for 10 years, as a sign of "commitment," Whitburn said, to the humanitarian purposes of reform. 46 And in 1997 he raised stipends paid to recipients placed in W-2 government jobs by 21 percent, a step upsetting to some conservatives. 47 Furthermore, Thompson was willing to spend lavishly on the child care, health care, and other services that Democrats demanded to ease the pain of reform. If the state in fact saved money due to the caseload decline, that was a windfall. Very seldom during the reform process did Republicans voice public concern about excessive spending. 48 On the other side, most Democrats were not unwilling reformers. They had their own reasons to criticize welfare, and they began doing so well before the Republicans forced them to.
In most urban states, Democratic politicians are not uncritical of welfare, but they defend entitlement, the essence of the unreformed system. Usually, they would like to see more work by the adult dependent, but they prefer to promote it on a voluntary basis by providing the recipients with more education, training, child care, or government jobs. They fear to enforce work, that is to demand it as a condition of aid, because to do so might threaten vulnerable families. Especially, they will not allow reform at the hands of their Republican opponents, whom they see as uncommitted to the poor, interested only in cutting back spending and taxes.
In that was "too broke to be fixed." 55 He did not flinch from asking blunt questions about how proposed liberal reforms would solve the personal and family problems of the poor.
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John Norquist was another liberal who, as an assistant majority leader in the Senate, reacted favorably to Thompson's initial proposals. Later, as a highly visible mayor of Milwaukee, he ridiculed traditional welfare as "a failure" that "ought to be abolished." 57 His main objection to Work Not Welfare and W-2 was not that they were too tough on recipients but that they offered them any cash at all (W-2 did permit some limited grants to recipients unable to work in the short run, although these people still faced required activities). He would have preferred a system in which only jobs were offered. 58 In this, he reflected the thinking of his adviser, David Riemer, one of several liberal theorists who think replacing aid with government employment would serve progressive purposes. As these comments suggest, Democrats regarded welfare as a failure because it looked like a bad deal compared to employment. They were more client-oriented than the Republicans, but they assumed that the recipients would be better off if they worked, and anything welfare did to block that was And after the state decided in 1993 to sunset AFDC and replace it, Democrats set up yet another legislative panel to decide how to do that. 71 In 1994, the idea of replacing cash with jobs was again pressed by Chuck Chvala, the Democratic challenger to Thompson's reelection. 72 On occasion, Democrats even claimed that they were more radical reformers than Thompson But by this point, Democratic thinking on welfare was hardly less radical than that of
Republicans. As noted above, most Democratic legislators ended up voting for W-2. Indeed, some said that it did not go far enough. Like AFDC, it covered needy families with children. Perhaps, these critics said, it ought to cover single people and childless couples as well. 75 Democrats had journeyed far from the world of entitlement.
OUTSIDE GROUPS
Another factor helping to explain the emergence of radical reform was that political forces outside elective politics did not stop it. Liberal groups lacked a veto over change, and business was unusually supportive.
In most urban states, minority leaders, advocate groups, and intellectuals are hostile to conservative welfare reform, and they often have enough influence to derail it. They may not be able to deliver many votes, but they have enough moral and intellectual authority to intimidate politicians who might want to question entitlement. It is difficult to contemplate making recipients work or stay in school in the face of community leaders or commentators who present this as immoral or ignorant, and who have the ear of the media. In a conservative national climate, these elements have lost the power they had 30 22 years ago to drive social policy to the left. But in most large states, they can still prevent it from moving decisively to the right. Whether even PRWORA has changed this is unclear.
Blacks
Black leaders are often presumed to be natural opponents of reform, because so many blacks rely on aid. In the Wisconsin legislature, some blacks did challenge Thompson. The most prominent were Senators Gwendolynne Moore and Gary George, Democrats representing poor areas of Milwaukee. They played the "race card" as black politicians often do elsewhere in America. Moore characterized
Thompson as a "successful demagogue" who "beat up on people of color" and whose reform amounted to a "new form of slavery." 76 George attacked Learnfare as "no different from South Africa." To him, Two-Tier implied that "If you're black, you don't get fair treatment in America." 77 As individuals, Moore and George were widely admired, according to my interviews.
Yet few other blacks or Democrats followed them. A more moderate black figure was Antonio Riley, the representative who in 1993 spearheaded the abolition of AFDC. Riley sat for the same heavily welfare-dependent Milwaukee district that Moore occupied before moving up to the Senate. But instead of defending the system, Riley declared that "Welfare is the jailer of our people." It caused blacks to be "written off" by the rest of society. Like many white liberals, Riley assumed that work was better than welfare, even for needy one-parent families. This reflected his own life experience. He had been on welfare himself but had also worked from a young age and begun his career in private business. Like
Riemer, he wanted to redesign welfare around work and to "make work pay," if necessary using government jobs. He became impatient with Republican "tinkering" and advocated a clean break with the past. W-2, as it emerged from Thompson's planners, was too severe for him, and he voted against the final legislation. But he still thought that "Parts of W-2 are light-years better than the old system," and he persisted in believing that it could be improved, for example by permitting more education and training.
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This stance made him, like some other Democrats, more of an ally than an opponent of Thompson. 78 More blacks supported his line than that of Moore or George. 79 Due to the weakness of black opposition, advocates defending entitlement on racial grounds did not become the voice of Milwaukee in the welfare debate, as they have in other big cities. Instead, the city was spoken for mainly by its elected leaders, most of whom, as mentioned earlier, were Democrats aggrieved by the old aid system. In short, blacks did not set themselves apart from other interests affected by reform, despite their unusual dependency on aid. They did not force the rest of the polity to treat welfare as a racial issue. That was why, other than delaying reforms in Milwaukee until late in the process, the state made no serious concessions to the minority character of welfare in urban areas.
Community Groups
Equally surprising, community organizations opposed to conservative reform had little clout. By all accounts, they had been very influential during the liberal era of welfare in the 1960s and 1970s. But they failed to stop Thompson's train. The main reason, as with blacks, was that their heart was not in it.
Opinion opposed to reform was not silent. Everyone I spoke to in Wisconsin mentioned the Welfare Warriors, a traditional welfare rights group that demanded that poor single mothers receive support as a matter of right. 80 Another such group, called Acorn, held demonstrations at welfare centers.
Advocate groups spoke at hearings in the legislature to oppose reform. They held news conferences and demonstrations at the capitol. But compared to the 1960s, they drew little attention. Politicians heard them but did not obey. They were more swayed by their own, more moderate opinions and by the public's forceful voice favoring change. The groups chose to accommodate reform rather than to oppose it root and branch. They criticized details while tacitly accepting the end of entitlement. They asked, for instance, that recipients of government jobs provided under W-2 receive regular wages and the earned income tax credit, rather than just welfare; that more education and training be permitted, rather than immediate work; that time limits be less rigid if recipients made a good-faith effort to work; that child care meet higher standards;
and that copayments for health and child care be limited. They also criticized the troubled implementation of SSF, PFP, and W-2 in Milwaukee, which led to the improper sanctioning of many clients. 84 The Thompson administration reached out to such groups sufficiently to give them a sense that they had been heard. Thus, like Antonio Riley and most Democrats, they became collaborators in the reform process more than adversaries.
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One inducement for community groups to cooperate was that W-2 perpetuated the "welfare industry" often criticized by conservatives. Because the program demanded work rather than simply denying aid, it required that many services-child care, job placement, government jobs, etc.-be delivered to a still-large caseload. Money was to be made doing this, and some of the community groups that might have obstructed reform instead became its contractors. This included the private organizations that ended up administering W-2 in Milwaukee. In this sense, the potential opposition was coopted. Said Pat DeLessio, "You've got African-American agencies that bought into this program," such as
Opportunities Industrialization Center and Goodwill Industries. Said Gwendolynne Moore, "This is a plantation," and "would-be activists are being paid to be the overseers." To this genteel world of earnest expertise, Tommy Thompson's election was a rude shock.
Thompson took just the approach to welfare-centering on moral issues and lifestyle-that the academics, with their antiseptic focus on economics and incentives, disparaged. Ever since then, they have belittled his achievements. They do not deny the dramatic caseload fall in the state, but, as noted above, they attributed it to Wisconsin's good economy and the decline in benefit levels rather than to
Thompson's welfare experiments. They also produced analyses of the welfare problem that suggested that few recipients could work and thus that the potential for work-oriented reform was slim. 88 They would prefer an approach to reform that centered much more on assured child support and "making work pay"-wage subsidies and guaranteed child and health care.
Yet they were unable to embarrass Thompson. One explanation is that the national debate about poverty and welfare had already turned rightward. Conservative analysts such as Charles Murray and Lawrence Mead focused on the lifestyle, not the economics, of poverty. They argued that welfare was promoting nonwork and family dissolution among the poor, either by the disincentives it set up, or due to its lack of serious work requirements. 89 The Thompson reformers countered the local intelligentsia by calling on some of these outside voices. On several occasions in early 1987, Mead, who was visiting at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, made presentations favoring work requirements to legislative and welfare department audiences, often alongside Garfinkel, the IRP expert who was the most receptive to enforcement approaches. 90 This argument for coupling work requirements with welfare had some impact.
It cut more ice in liberal Wisconsin than the more radical demand by Murray simply to abolish assistance for the working-aged. 91 Thompson also accepted the offer of the Hudson Institute, a moderate think tank from Indianapolis, to help him plan the redesign of welfare. The president of Hudson, Leslie Lenkowsky, was himself a recognized welfare expert and a critic of economic approaches to reform. 92 Hudson assembled a team of experts from Washington and Wisconsin-none of them academics-and this group was chiefly responsible for the design of W-2. This outside input helps to explain why W-2 represents a fresh conception and a sharper break with AFDC than the reforms seen in other states. In a way, the Wisconsin Idea continued, but the expertise politicians relied on no longer came from the University of Wisconsin.
IRP was eclipsed for political reasons, but also because its analysis of poverty was out of date.
The idea that poverty and dependency were rooted in economics or social barriers was a lot more plausible in the 1960s, when most poor adults worked, than in later decades, when poverty work levels were much lower, welfare rose, and destitution was more closely linked to behavioral problems, particularly nonwork and out-of-wedlock pregnancy. Solutions now required the use of social authority to change lifestyle, so social policy became more administrative. Work requirements in welfare were the leading instance. 93 That was a change that most of the IRP group could not understand or accept.
Business
Like other conservative forces, business groups oppose large-scale dependency, which they see as raising the cost of government and undercutting the quality of the labor force. But they often would prefer simply to cut back benefits and eligibility for aid. They fear that a more complicated, workoriented reform would end up costing even more than welfare now does. This view helps explain the relatively hard-line, aid-cutting approach to reform taken, for example, by Republicans in New York
State. Unfortunately, it is unacceptable to big-city liberals. Much of the paralysis of reform in the larger states results from this.
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In Wisconsin, by contrast, business has been a constructive force for change. Businessmen in need of more low-skilled labor have pushed for work-oriented reform in certain key counties, including
Dane and Fond du Lac. 94 At the state level, business groups did not oppose the Thompson reforms on grounds of cost, even early on before it was clear that the caseload fall would more than finance all the needed new services.
More unusually, business used its own money to finance experiments in reform, not waiting for Progressivism had a particularly strong influence on Wisconsin. Up through the 1880s, the state's politics was dominated by a Republican party suspicious of government and moralistic groups of reformers, known as mugwumps, who wanted to clean up cities and politics, but on an elitist basis that did not draw wide support. Politics was factionalized among various business, labor, and ethnic groups.
But in the course of the 1893-97 depression and its aftermath, broader-based demands for public action against entrenched economic interests arose. The new attitude was that Wisconsinites should work together to solve common problems through politics, setting aside their suspicions of each other and government itself. Government was to directly serve "the people," whom it appealed to over the heads of all intervening interests. This was the sentiment that Robert M. La Follette molded into a electoral crusade on the state and then the national scene. 100 
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Several legacies resulted, all of them favorable for the state's recent ability to transform welfare. Compared to parties in most other states, Wisconsin's political parties are not oriented to organization. They make little attempt to control who enters them; nominations for office are abandoned to the primary system. The parties are coalitions of able self-starters who get into office on their own, chiefly because they are interested in policy problems. Issues are taken seriously in their own right, not only as means of garnering influence. 108 Parties still matter in Wisconsin. The parties are careerist, highly competitive, and often vote in the legislature on party lines. The close division of power in the legislature encourages this. Indeed, the parties are among the most closely matched in the country, a fact that also promotes a liberal social policy. At the same time, they are not deeply divided in their beliefs or in the coalitions who support them. 109 Thus, the parties compete sharply for power, but they also can work together once the elections are over. The attitude is "live and let live," Tony Earl said, not "kill or be killed." Another leader remarked, "We do everything in Wisconsin by bipartisan committee." The most dramatic expression of this trust was the willingness of Democrats to sunset AFDC in 1993 even though they knew that
Thompson would likely design the replacement. Collaboration between business and government is also "part of our Progressive tradition," Thompson wrote; "we share a commitment to an idea that state government can and should work." 110 The parties focus as much on problem-solving as on partisan maneuver. The welfare battle generated rivalry, but the larger impulse was to find a true solution to the welfare dilemma. In tackling that problem, Tom Loftus, whom one associate called a "policy wonk," announced that he was "after the next generation, not the next election." 111 Both parties engaged in serious inquiry, and did not impose preformed solutions. Most notably, Democratic policymakers did not armor themselves against the hostile feedback they received about welfare, even though it was anathema to their liberal convictions.
They took it on board. They threw up their hands and admitted that the conservative reformers had a case. So they accepted the need for change. That willingness to face reality was critical to Wisconsin's bipartisan yet radical reform. 112 The absence of deeply entrenched partisan positions on policy was essential to tackling welfare, because the problem crosscuts the normal partisan divide. Democrats tend to argue for more government, Republicans for less, but successful welfare reform instead requires changing the character of government. It must change from a mere benefit system to one in which support is coupled with functioning requirements. That requires Republicans to accept a larger government, and Democrats a more demanding one, than they do normally. Only a close focus on the problem, rather than on partisanship, could have led Wisconsin policymakers to their paternalist outcome.
A third legacy was a political culture committed, as the Progressives wished, to collective action in the general interest. In a famous analysis, Daniel Elazar identified three strands in American political culture, one or another dominant in each state. The "individualistic" culture, characteristic of the mid-Atlantic region, conceives politics mainly in market terms as a way of distributing material advantages to individuals and interests. This approach tolerates a politics oriented to economic subsidy and payoffs to politicians and their supporters. The "traditionalistic" culture, dominant in the South, allows government only a limited role in a social order oriented to the maintenance of racial and class hierarchy. Wisconsin, rather, represents the "moralistic" culture of New England, the upper Midwest, and parts of the West, where government is seen as "a positive instrument" for the pursuit of the "general welfare." In that tradition, benefits for narrow interests are suspect. Policy is supposed to be based on a general rationale that leaders sell to an intelligent and undifferentiated public. 113 The combination of this moralistic political culture with conservative social values powerfully equipped Wisconsin for welfare reform. Most states with an ambitious governmental tradition, for example New York, are too divided socially and too tolerant of big-city social evils to be leaders of reform. 114 Conversely, most states with a cohesive culture, as in the South, confine their governments to a limited role. They may implement social programs offered by Washington, but they do not originate them. In Wisconsin, however, society is conservative, yet government is ambitious. Both the society and government are strong. Such a state will want to enforce values in welfare, such as work, and it will have the governmental enterprise to do this.
That strange combination helps explain why, to an outsider, the state can seem like a chameleon, liberal and conservative at the same time. Wisconsin is above average among the states in the liberalism of both public opinion and state policy. 115 It is also a state with a strong union tradition that once elected One trigger internal to the state probably was cost. By the 1980s, the rapid growth in welfare produced fiscal strain. Along with health costs, welfare dominated the state budget, while HSS had become the largest public agency in the state. Wisconsin was losing jobs. To Tommy Thompson's eye, the problem was that welfare recipients were coming to Wisconsin while workers were leaving. Thus, one of his promises when he first ran for governor in 1986 was to cut taxes and spending. 117 On the other hand, as noted already, Thompson's reform did not center on cuts but on shifting spending from income maintenance to work programs. He often said reform would cost more money rather than less, although the caseload fall did in fact save money. Thompson did economize on government, but mainly by squeezing and reorganizing other agencies, not welfare.
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A better argument is that the failures of welfare itself triggered reform. Not only the migration issue but the inability of good economic conditions to reduce dependency signaled to politicians and voters alike that something was wrong. Welfare was failing in its mission to help people while returning them to self-sufficiency. To use John Kingdon's theory of the agenda, this agreed sense of a problem then joined with a political opportunity, in the form of Thompson's election, and with a plausible policy alternative, in the form of work programs, to create a "policy window." That juncture explains why, in the formative period of 1985 to 1987, policy shifted so sharply away from benefit increases and toward 36 work enforcement. Alternatively, one can, following Baumgartner and Jones, speak of the slow decay of the welfare policy subsystem. The generous system that liberals and advocates had built up in the 1960s and 1970s came under increasing challenge, until finally critics and politicians of all stripes turned on it.
Then a monolith that had seemed unassailable crumbled in only a few years. 119 In the end, the old welfare was simply unacceptable to a society and a government deeply committed to functioning well. It was an insult to Wisconsin's cohesive social order, and even more to its masterful regime. Both parties felt this. They reacted not by retreat, but by crafting and launching a still more ambitious welfare system.
